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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
[The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the 
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of November, 1931, 
have been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These 
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way 
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor, 
The Journal of Accountancy.]
Examination in Commercial Law
November 13, 1931, 9 A.M. to 12:30 P.M.
Group I
Answer all questions in this group.
No. 1:
John Mason at the request of Walter Burroughs lent $150 to Burroughs, 
stating at the time that he, Mason, owed that amount to Charles Evans to 
whom he was obligated to pay it ten days thereafter. Burroughs, in considera­
tion of the loan and at the time of receiving the $150, promised Mason that he, 
Burroughs, would pay $150 to Evans ten days thereafter. Evans knew noth­
ing of this loan and promise until he tried unsuccessfully to collect from Mason. 
After Burroughs’ failure to pay, can Evans recover in an action brought by him 
against Burroughs?
Answer:
In most jurisdictions Evans can recover from Burroughs on a contract thus 
made for his benefit when it results from a debtor-creditor relation between 
himself and one of the parties and is not a mere gratuity. Evans’ ignorance 
of the contract would be immaterial.
No. 2:
Prentice made a valid contract with Adams whereunder Adams was to sell 
Prentice’s goods on commission during the period from January 1, 1931, to 
June 30, 1931. Adams made satisfactory sales up to May 15, 1931, and was 
then about to close an unusually large order when Prentice suddenly and with­
out notice revoked Adams’ authority to sell. Can Adams continue to sell 
Prentice’s goods during the unexpired term of his contract?
Answer:
The authority given Adams by contract to sell Prentice’s goods on commis­
sion created a sales agency which could be terminated at any time, notwith­
standing the contract period had not expired. Adams can recover damages for 
breach of his contract, but he no longer has authority to sell Prentice’s goods 
and can not force Prentice to deliver.
No. 3:
Carlin borrowed $10,000 from White for one year, giving as security a mort­
gage upon real estate.
(a) Six months later, Carlin died. At the maturity of the loan, what rights 
has White and against whom can he enforce them?
(b) If White instead of Carlin had died six months after the loan was made, 
to which of the following persons should Carlin make payment at maturity— 
White’s legatees, heirs, testamentary trustee, administrator, next of kin, execu­
tor, devisees?
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(a) Unless state statutes prescribe a different course, White may present his 
entire claim to the estate for allowance as a secured claim and receive payment 
if the heir or devisee of the land is entitled to exoneration, or he may foreclose 
the mortgage at maturity and claim against the estate for the unpaid balance 
only.
(b) Carlin should pay White’s executor or administrator at maturity.
No. 4:
Sanborn in June, 1928, while entirely solvent, executed and gave to his wife 
as a gift a formal bill of sale of his interest in the Mann Drug Corporation, in 
which he owned 110 shares of stock, but he retained the stock certificate, the 
stock was not transferred on the books of the corporation, the corporation was 
not notified of the bill of sale, and Sanborn continued to vote on the stock and 
receive dividends until April, 1931. At that time he was hopelessly insolvent 
and knew it, but without receiving any consideration he indorsed the certificate 
for these 110 shares to his wife, who had the transfer recorded on the corpora­
tion’s books. Was this transfer of stock fraudulent as against Sanborn’s 
creditors?
Answer:
The transfer is fraudulent as against Sanborn’s creditors. The uniform 
stock transfer act requires delivery of the certificate itself to effect transfer, and 
an attempted transfer without such delivery amounts only to a promise to 
transfer. When such implied promise is without consideration, a subsequent 
transfer in pursuance thereof, if made when the transferor is insolvent, is fraud­
ulent as against his creditors.
No. 5:
Atwood and Chapin were partners and their business was insolvent. Atwood 
fraudulently represented to Morton that the firm’s business was solvent and 
thereby induced Morton to become a partner and to make a capital investment 
of $10,000. As soon as Morton discovered the fraud, he personally obtained 
possession of most of the firm’s assets and then notified his partners that he had 
withdrawn from the firm. Thereafter a creditor of the firm whose claim had 
arisen prior to Morton’s becoming a partner, sued all three partners.
(a) What is the extent of Morton’s liability, if any, to the creditor who was 
suing?
(b) What rights has Morton with respect to the fraud perpetrated on him?
Answer:
(a) Morton has no liability to the creditor of the old partnership if the value 
of the assets taken by him do not exceed his capital investment. Fraud in the 
inception of a partnership makes it voidable from the beginning except as to 
third persons who have given credit to the new firm. The uniform partnership 
act allows the defrauded partner to retain firm assets to the extent of his invest­
ment after satisfying partnership liabilities to third persons. Partnership 
liabilities within the meaning of this section would appear to include only 
creditors of the new firm, and while the act makes an incoming partner liable 
to the extent of the new firm’s assets to creditors of the old firm, I do not think 
this would be interpreted to include a partner who is entitled to rescission since 
a rescinded partnership is generally considered void from its inception so far as 
creditors of the old firm are concerned. I have in mind also that in this case the 
assets available for the creditor do not appear to have been lessened by the 
entry and withdrawal of Morton so long as he takes out no more than he put in.
142
American Institute of Accountants Examinations
The creditor should not be allowed to better his position by taking advantage of 
the fraud practised on Morton.
(b) Morton is entitled to rescind, and, subordinate to creditors of the new 
firm, has a lien on firm assets, or may retain them, to the extent of his invest­
ment. He has the same rights as other creditors, but subordinate to creditors 
of the new firm, to recover any payments made by him for the account of the 
firm. He is entitled to be indemnified by Atwood against all debts and liabili­
ties of the partnership, and may recover against Atwood all damages suffered.
Group II
Answer any five questions in this group. No credit will be given for additional 
answers, and if any are submitted only the first five answers will be considered.
No. 6:
In what ways or by what means can the existence of a corporation come to an 
end?
Answer:
A corporation’s existence may be terminated in the following ways:
(1) Forfeiture of its franchise by the adjudication of a court.
(2) Loss of its charter by a charter provision to that effect in case the 
corporation fails to meet certain requirements.
(3) Repeal of its charter under the reserved power of the state.
(4) Voluntary surrender of the franchise by the stockholders.
(5) Expiration of the time limited for its existence in the charter.
No. 7:
A policy of fire insurance issued to a partnership in its firm name makes no 
mention of changes in the personnel of the firm.
(a) Does the subsequent withdrawal of a partner affect the validity of the 
policy?
(b) Does the subsequent admission of a new partner affect the validity of the 
policy?
Answer:
The withdrawal of a partner as a general rule does not vitiate an insurance 
contract on partnership property, although contrary results have been reached 
in a few jurisdictions on the wording of particular policies. The alienation 
clauses of policies are more strictly construed when new partners are admitted, 
however, and it is held that this avoids a policy prohibiting any change in title 
or possession of the property.
No. 8:
(a) What is a conditional sale and how does it differ from a lease with an op­
tion to purchase?
(b) How in general can a conditional vendor protect his rights?
Answer:
(a) A conditional sale is one in which title to goods sold and delivered on 
credit is reserved in the vendor until payment.
The principal difference between a conditional sale and a lease with option to 
purchase is that the latter does not obligate the lessee to pay the purchase price 
unless the option is exercised. This difference is one of substance, however, not 
of form, and when the so-called lessee is obligated to pay as rent an amount 
substantially equal to the purchase price, the transaction is held to be a condi­
tional sale.
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(b) In general, a conditional vendor can protect his rights by recording the 
conditional sale.
No. 9:
Tompkins makes a negotiable promissory note payable to the order of the 
First National Bank and before delivery Chase writes his name on the back of 
it. What kind of endorser, if any, is Chase and what is his liability, if any, to 
the payee and to subsequent endorsees?
Answer:
Chase is an accommodation endorser. He is liable on the note to the payee 
or any subsequent holder for value to the same extent that any other endorser 
would be.
No. 10:
(a) What is meant by an act of bankruptcy?
(b) Name the various acts of bankruptcy.
(c) What is a referee in bankruptcy, how does he obtain his position as ref­
eree, and what in general are his duties?
(d) What is a trustee in bankruptcy, how does he obtain his position as trus­
tee, and what in general are his duties?
(e) What debts, if any, are not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy?
Answer:
(a) Acts of bankruptcy are defined by statute. The commission of any one 
of them within four months is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition in in­
voluntary bankruptcy against the person committing such act, if at the time of 
filing such petition that person is insolvent.
(b) An act of bankruptcy is committed by:
(1) Conveying, transferring, concealing or removing property with in­
tent to delay or defraud creditors.
(2) Transferring property while insolvent to any creditor with intent to 
prefer such creditor.
(3) Suffering or permitting, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a 
preference through legal proceedings and not having such preference dis­
charged.
(4) Making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, applying 
for a receiver or trustee while insolvent, or having a receiver or trustee of 
one’s property appointed because of insolvency.
(5) Admitting in writing one’s inability to pay debts and willingness to 
be adjudged a bankrupt.
(c) A referee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court of bankruptcy, ap­
pointed by the court, and to whom the petition in bankruptcy is referred. His 
duties in general are to supervise the administration of bankrupt estates.
(d) A trustee is an officer of the court of bankruptcy, appointed by the 
creditors in meeting, or, in event of their failure to appoint, by the court. His 
general duties are to collect, conserve and liquidate the assets of the estate, pay 
dividends as declared by the referee, keep accounts and make reports on the 
estate.
(e) Briefly, a discharge in bankruptcy will not release debts for taxes; liabili­
ties for obtaining property fraudulently; for willful and malicious injuries, ali­
mony, maintenance of wife or child, seduction of unmarried female, breach of 
promise and seduction, or criminal conversation; unscheduled debts to creditors 
without notice or knowledge of proceedings; fraudulent debts created by bank­
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rupt while acting as officer or in fiduciary capacity; wages earned within three 
months by workmen, clerks, salesmen, or servants; and debts due employees 
for money received or retained to secure faithful performance of employment 
contracts.
No. 11:
A testamentary trustee duly made an authorized purchase of 400 shares of 
capital stock (of the par value of $100 each) at 120. Subsequently he received 
400 rights entitling him to subscribe to 100 additional shares at 100. Entirely 
regardless of taxable income, how should the trustee render account, distin­
guishing between principal and income of the trust, in each of the following 
cases:
(a) The trustee exercised his rights and later sold 40 shares at 130.
(b) The trustee did not exercise his rights but sold all the rights at $4.50 each.
Answer:
Corporate stock rights and increase in value of corporate stock itself are 
generally held to be part of the principal of the trust estate, not income. Some 
jurisdictions depart from this rule with regard to rights, and hold as income so 
much of the value of the rights as represents undivided profits of the corpora­
tion accumulated since the acquisition of the stock by the trust, decreased by 
any loss in value of the stock from date of acquisition. Similarly, a few juris­
dictions hold that so much of the increased value of stock as is represented by 
undivided profits is income. The only answer to (a) and (b) is therefore that 
authorities differ.
No. 12:
A corporation in 1925 constructed a factory building for its own use at a cost 
of $200,000. In 1929 it was insured for $250,000, and upon a total loss by fire 
during that year the entire amount of the insurance was received from the in­
surance company. Two hundred thousand dollars of this insurance money 
was immediately invested in the construction of a new factory which was sold in 
1931 for $175,000. In what years and in what amounts would any taxable gain 
or deductible loss be recognized under the revenue act of 1928? (In your com­
putations, disregard depreciation.)
Answer:
Assuming the new factory was similar or related in service or use to the old 
factory, gain in 1929 is only recognized to the extent of the insurance money 
not expended in the acquisition of the new factory. This taxable gain would 
amount to $50,000 in 1929 since $200,000 of the $250,000 was expended for the 
new factory. Deductible loss would be sustained in 1931 in the sum of $25,000 
arrived at as follows: The basis or cost of the old factory was $200,000 which is 
to be decreased by the insurance money ($50,000) not expended for the new 
factory and increased in the amount of gain ($50,000) recognized upon the con­
version of the property in 1929; the resulting basis being $200,000 and the 
property selling for $175,000 in 1931, deductible loss of $25,000 is sustained in 
1931.
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